In a diplomatic tour de force, the US government managed to impress on its partners and allies in NATO and the European Union the clear and present danger of a Russian spring offensive against Ukraine. All duly expressed grave concern regarding the recent deployment of Russian troops and hardware in the vicinity of the border.

On December 7 (‘the day that lives in infamy’), Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin met for a two-hour-long online summit to discuss their souring relations and the escalating tensions. The talks went nowhere and were afterwards described as ‘frank, intensive, and robust’ which constitutes a diplomatic euphemism for an exchange of threats and harsh words.

Though Moscow vehemently denies any intention to move on Ukraine, the US and the EU are already busy issuing warnings and devising sanctions in case the Kremlin decides to embark on a military adventure.

Usually suspicious of American intelligence assessments, even Germany now seems convinced that Russia possibly has malicious designs its neighbour’s territorial integrity. Berlin is key in any pre- and post-conflict scenario as the most resilient and valuable conduit available to the Kremlin – usually the only channel that stays open after Russia has strayed from the straight and narrow.

Green Limits to Patience

Russian brinkmanship is likely to pose the first foreign policy test for German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his ‘traffic light’ coalition of greens, liberals, and social democrats. The Greens in particular show an eagerness to depart from the policy of patience and engagement favoured by former Chancellor Angela Merkel whose back-channel dealings with President Vladimir Putin usually managed to keep the Russian strongman in check.

Just before the virtual summit, President Biden had asked Berlin to prevent the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from becoming operational as part of a much broader sanctions package being prepared. Other possible punitive measures include stopping the trade in Russian bonds on the secondary market and shutting the country out of the Swift global payment system. 

Whilst President Putin was seen to be unimpressed, much less intimidated, by Mr Biden’s warnings, he has been loath to offend Chancellor Merkel in the past and will most likely continue to pay considerable attention to the mood in the German capital. Both the US and Russia are actively courting the new administration of Chancellor Olaf Scholz with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggesting that Washington and Berlin are now in full agreement over the need to shut down the controversial gas pipeline in case of war.

Mr Sullivan found a rather unlikely ally in Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s new foreign affairs minister, who as co-leader of the Green Party has long advocated for increased pressure on Russia. Firebrand Left Party (Die Linke) leader Oskar Lafontaine predicts a ‘catastrophe’ with Mrs Baerbock at the helm of the country’s foreign policy.

In an interview with the conservative Die Welt newspaper, Mr Lafontaine expressed a fear that “she will uncritically follow the US’ confrontational policy towards Russia and China.” During the election campaign, Mrs Baerbock called Nord Stream 2 a ‘treacherous plan’ on the part of President Putin to gain and exert influence of Europe.

Public Opinion

That view is, however, not shared by most Germans. Whilst plotting a course between superpowers, Chancellor Scholz will have to keep an eye on German public opinion which does not favour any confrontation with Russia and is, overall, sceptical of US intentions. Most Germans fail to see the need for a tougher stance to rein in Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions and place their trust in their country’s soft power – essentially its economic heft – to carry the day.

According to John Lough, author and an associate fellow at Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme, German public officials – and, indeed, the wider public – often do not realise that they are burdened by history when facing Russia.

In his book Germany’s Russia Problem, Mr Lough argues that “Germany’s historically conditioned reflexes have distorted its views of Russia and continue to inhibit its behaviour.” Mr Lough concludes that ‘fear, sentimentality, and guilt’ have left Berlin ‘deluded’ about Russia’s real intentions such as a structural weakening of the Germany’s transatlantic links and the gradual undermining of both NATO and the EU.

However, in his writings, Mr Lough is much less decisive when it comes to suggesting concrete policy alternatives. There are, in fact, few to speak of. Since 1969, German relations with Russia (then Soviet Union) have been guided by the principles of Ostpolitik, originally formulated by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) – ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ (Change through Rapprochement). Mr Brandt’s successors up to and including Mrs Merkel have left this approach largely unchanged.

In December, Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated the need for a new EU-wide Ostpolitik based on the principle that ‘Europe speaks with one voice’. Mr Scholz also emphasised the importance of adhering to the criteria established by the Helsinki Commission and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which include a commitment to the idea that borders must not be moved by force, adding that Russia had ‘already violated this’.

Rebuffed

Whilst critical of Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and that country’s covert involvement in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, Mr Scholz was careful to leave the door ajar for dialogue. He steers clear of any talk of sanctions. The new German chancellor has but little room for manoeuvring should the situation escalate and may yet have to take a stance if he indeed desires the EU to speak with one voice.

Just last June, both France and Germany pushed gently for a reopening of a dialogue between Brussels and Moscow but were promptly and brusquely rebuffed by nearly all other member states. The mood is Europe is not one of reconciliation or engagement with President Putin. 

Whilst Chancellor Scholz realises that his country sits squarely at the centre of any policy initiative or response regarding Russia, he will likely discover before long that fence-sitting is not an option should Russian troops invade Ukraine. Before that happens, if it ever does, his best option would likely be to insist on agency for Kyiv and the Ukrainian government of President Volodymyr Zelensky.

So far, all talk has been about Ukraine without involving that country. This rather peculiar state of affairs virtually guarantees that any compromise struck to avoid conflict now is unlikely to ‘stick’ and douse the fire.

Cover photo: German foreign affairs minister Annalena Baerbock.

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© 2017 Photo by Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion